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Bhushan Lodha
5/13/20260 comments

List all PGRS acquisitions and ebitda multiple they paid

Progress Software (PRGS) does not publicly disclose the specific trailing EV/EBITDA (Enterprise Value to Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization) multiples they pay for their acquisitions.

Because PRGS typically acquires private companies, PE carve-outs, or companies that are running closer to break-even to maximize top-line growth, pre-acquisition EBITDA is often negligible, non-existent, or kept confidential.

Instead of traditional EBITDA multiples, PRGS values targets on Revenue/ARR multiples (typically 3.0x to 4.0x). Their entire acquisition model is based on buying these sticky revenue streams and rapidly slashing operational overhead to force the acquired asset into their strict 39–41% operating margin framework. By doing this, a 3.5x revenue multiple effectively transforms into a highly accretive ~8.5x to 9.5x post-synergy operating income multiple within 12 months.

Here is the financial breakdown of PRGS's acquisitions under their current "Total Growth Strategy" (2019–Present), followed by their historical acquisitions.

The "Total Growth" Era (2019–Present)

This era represents PRGS's systematic transition into an aggressive, debt-financed serial acquirer of infrastructure software.

AcquisitionYearPurchase PriceDisclosed Target Revenue/ARRImplied EV/Rev MultiplePost-Synergy Target
ShareFile2024$875 Million~$240 Million~3.6x>40% operating margin
MarkLogic2023$355 MillionNot explicitly disclosed (~$100M+ est.)~3.5x (Est.)Accretive within Q2
Kemp LoadMaster2021$258 Million~$70 Million~3.7xAccretive within year 1
Chef Software2020$220 Million~$70 Million~3.1xAccretive within year 1
Ipswitch2019$225 Million~$75 Million~3.0xAccretive within year 1

Notable Historical Acquisitions (Pre-2019)

Prior to 2019, Progress made several acquisitions to build out its initial application development and database management capabilities. Disclosure on these older, often smaller deals is limited.

  • Telerik (2014): $262.5 Million (A massive acquisition at the time that brought in UI tools like Kendo UI, shaping PRGS's developer tooling portfolio).
  • Rollbase (2013): Undisclosed (Brought cloud platform-as-a-service capabilities).
  • Savvion (2010): ~$49 Million (Business Process Management).
  • Actional (2006): ~$32 Million (Web services management).
  • Neon Systems (2005): ~$68 Million (Mainframe integration).
  • Apama (2005): ~$25 Million (Algorithmic trading and complex event processing—later sold to Software AG in 2013).
  • Persistence Software (2004): ~$16 Million.
  • DataDirect Technologies (2003): ~$115 Million.
  • eXcelon (2002): ~$24 Million.

The Valuation Takeaway: If you are building a systematic acquirer model for PRGS, evaluating them on the EBITDA multiple paid at closing will yield an incomplete picture. The critical metric to track is the EV/ARR multiple paid (~3.5x average) multiplied against their proven ability to extract a 40% operating margin from that ARR within four quarters of integration.

Source: PRGS vs. CSU: Acquisition Strategies Compared

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