what was sharefile's gross margin when they acquired it?

Progress Software management explicitly stated during their Q1 2025 earnings call that the ShareFile business had standalone gross margins "north of 80%" (with analysts generally modeling it in the low 80s, around 82–83%) at the time of the acquisition.

This specific metric was a major selling point for the $875 million deal and represents a pivotal shift in how PRGS evaluates future acquisitions.

Why ShareFile's Gross Margin Mattered to PRGS

Historically, Progress Software's core portfolio consisted of legacy, on-premise infrastructure software with incredibly high gross margins (their corporate average typically hovers between 81% and 86%).

Because of this, PRGS management had previously avoided acquiring native Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) companies. SaaS businesses often carry heavy cloud hosting costs (AWS/Azure) and higher operational drag, which usually depresses their gross margins compared to traditional software licenses.

ShareFile was the exception that changed their playbook:

• The Margin Match: Because ShareFile was a highly mature, optimized SaaS platform (carved out from Citrix/Cloud Software Group), its >80% gross margin fit perfectly into Progress's existing financial profile without diluting their profitability.
• The "SaaS Expertise" Pivot: Prior to the ShareFile deal, SaaS accounted for only about 3% of Progress's total revenues. Post-acquisition, SaaS jumped to nearly 30%.

Because ShareFile proved that PRGS could integrate a massive SaaS asset while maintaining "excellent gross margins," management has openly stated that this success expands their M&A aperture. They are now actively hunting for other high-margin, cloud-native SaaS companies to acquire, using ShareFile’s operations as the blueprint.